

II Central Intelligence Agency that couldn't be fixed if we could go back to 1938—the year of Munich—and do what we should have done then: set up a real secret intelligence agency in advance of World War II and our emergence as a major world power.

As it is, the CIA was set up on terms which violated the basic principles of secret intelligence, it was saddled with objectives which were irrelevant to our long-term national interest, and it was encouraged to develop along lines which had no relation whatsoever to the art—or craft—of intelligence. As a result, it has repeatedly served as the X that marks the spot where massive and humiliating accidents have occurred: the U-2 spy-plane brought down over Russia, the faithless fiasco at the Bay of Pigs, and the recent subsidy scandals compromising the National Student Association and spreading to labor unions, news services and even to the startled Norman Thomas and the National Council of Churches.

This has been a jack-pot for Soviet counter-intelligence and propaganda and is due to the CIA's failure to observe the elementary rule: don't put too many eggs in any one basket. Early in 1941, when F.D.R. was setting up the small White House war-time intelligence unit which operated for 5 years, he laid down the American theory of intelligence:

"During the First World War we had any number of parallel and competing intelligence outfits. This puzzled us quite a bit but it worried the Germans much more. They never could decide which was our real intelligence service and couldn't tell, when they penetrated one of them, whether they were getting anything worth having."

An Immature Theory

This statement betrayed the imma-

How The CIA Got That Way

Our noted author, who often writes under the pseudonym of Jay Franklin, can speak of the CIA from experience. He was there when it all started, and saw how it went wrong.

By JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

is limited to pugilism: a part of national defense pin-pointed against a particular adversary in a particular conflict. It blissfully ignored the fact that the purpose of a real intelligence service is to obtain prompt, accurate and pertinent information, not otherwise available, by which to measure the trends and necessities of foreign nations and to establish the intentions and capabilities of their governments, relative to ourselves. In short, Roosevelt's intelligence was directed against the Axis, just as the CIA was later to be directed

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CIA-RDP74-00297R000300580001-8 survival of information about our friends and neighbors, such as Great Britain, France, Cuba, Mexico and Canada.

The basic principles of secret intelligence are as well-known as the rules of chess:

1. Never allow a foreign intelligence service, however friendly, to obtain a foothold in our organization.

2. Never make yourself conspicuous, except when needed to distract attention from something else that you are doing.

3. In a changing world, keep tabs on your friends and allies as much as on your enemies.

4. Pre-select and screen your prospective agents, never let them select you.

5. Compartmentalize your operations and never let any one individual know too much so that if one group is penetrated or if one man defects the others will not be compromised.

6. In subsidizing or infiltrating private organizations, never allow them to realize the source of the funds or the fact of the infiltration.

7. The heart of intelligence is the swift, accurate evaluation of reports and their communication to the responsible political authority.

8. A national intelligence agency must reflect that nation's character and history, as Soviet intelligence reflects the conspiratorial-terrorist legacy of the Communist Revolution or as British intelligence reflects 400 years of British history from Lord Burghley to James Bond.

On the record, the CIA appears to have flunked on all but one of these kindergarten principles. It has tried to compensate by reliance on gadgetry and money as substitutes for wisdom and experience, and it has behaved more like an industrial enterprise than as a political arm of government.

This is because the CIA's genealogy

possible for the periodic leaks, eruptions and revelations which have beset it in recent years. A spring can rise no higher than its source and, in this case, the source was tainted even before Pearl Harbor.

It Began With Roosevelt

It all began when President Roosevelt put "Wild Bill" Donovan in charge of, first the Office of Facts and Figures and then the Office of Strategic Services: a weird combination of widely advertised hush-hush intelligence and courageous sabotage and commando operations. This bureaucratic cocktail was only designed to provide Wild Bill with a front-row seat at World War II.

Donovan's boyish disregard for the nature of national intelligence was demonstrated when he sent David Bruce over to London to get the famous British Intelligence Service to provide the blue-prints for an American ditto. This meant that the British had infiltrated our organization, methods and objectives in advance, at the very moment they were trying to plant their own secret agent in the White House and Soviet spies were zeroing in on our atomic secrets. In the European Theater of Operations, the OSS served as a sort of Ladies Auxiliary to the British intelligence and, in cooperating with the Partisan Underground, casually got itself infiltrated by the Communists, who were also infiltrating the State Department and Treasury at Washington.

One of the worst effects of the British patronage of the OSS was its Old School Tie syndrome, translated into an Ivy League fixation. With the advent of democracy, the British upper classes created the civil service, including intelligence, as a social bomb-shelter for their younger sons. Theodore Roosevelt had fully understood that it was necessary to enlist both the dudes and the cowboys in recruiting his Rough Riders but both OSS and the CIA

CIA-RDP74-00297R000300580001-8 our prisons and penitentiaries in recruiting its undercover agents.

CIA even sent "recruiting teams" to college campuses, competing with DuPont, Dow Chemical and Gulf Oil for promising undergraduates who could be attracted to intelligence as a life-long career but ignored the remarkable human by-products at Dannemora, Joliet and San Quentin. Intelligence became not only a career and a privileged sanctuary for the college graduates but a big business enterprise, with mammoth headquarters on the Potomac and a world-wide net-work of agencies, just like the Ford Motor Company or U.S. Steel. Recruiting secret agents became assimilated to the American skilled-labor market, inviting infiltration via the payroll.

Glowing publicity stories of "Inside the CIA," "books by eminent American intelligence operators, and broad-based public and Congressional relations programs placed the agency in the position of being just another competing Washington bureaucracy, with the unique advantage of handling limitless unvouchered funds and being immune from government audit. Operating under these terms, it is a miracle that the leaks and scandals have been so few and that it still retains the favor of Congress.

Partly that is because the Defense Intelligence Agency, which evaluates intelligence, was established to remove the vital field of military espionage from CIA Control. During the War both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Army's G2 had done a sound professional job, without paying undue attention to OSS. Then, too, the State Department, though still suspected of Communist infiltration, began to resume its function as a major source of political intelligence. Finally, CIA's evaluation service was handled with skill, discretion and promptitude. The best in-

if it is not understood and its significance accepted by the government itself. Here the Agency was enormously assisted by the long direction of Allen W. Dulles. Dulles was America's greatest spy-master since Alan Pinkerton, comparable to Britain's William Wiseman and Sir William Stephenson. He was a master of the double-bluff, setting up business in conspicuous public headquarters which no sane Nazi or Soviet agent could ever imagine were the real headquarters for American spying.

He was also a scholar and grasped the fact that evaluation is the heart of intelligence. Whereas the Agency had suffered the indignity of being commanded by General Walter Bedell Smith, apparently as a reward for his disastrous miscalculation of the time Russia required to develop the A-Bomb, under Dulles there was scholarship, research, imagination, organization and insight in the processing of reports that marks a major contribution in this vitally important field.

Big Business Operation

Basically, the case against the CIA is that it has made intelligence a computerized mass-production Big Business enterprise instead of the art of understanding clearly the aims, plans and ambitions of other nations. It tends to follow the British tradition of massive bribery—the so-called "St. George's Cavalry" of golden sovereigns—rather than the favorite Soviet method of murder, although there are many who believe that the CIA had a hand in the catastrophic assassination of the Diem regime in South Vietnam.

Paradoxically, its demerits constitute its greatest strength: it spends so much money—the exact figure is secret but runs into the billions—and gives a privileged economic sanctuary to so many deserving nephews and brothers-in-law of men in public life that, politically speaking, it is untouchable.

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five times as much as British Intelligence and accomplishes about one-fifth as much as London's century-old spy-system. Since the Soviets practice mass-espionage, our costs are probably as great as Russia's, except that Soviet intelligence uses local Communist and other fronts and pays off in terms of blackmail rather than cash whenever possible. In any case, with expenses and personnel "classified," in our experience of American bureaucracy, this means that both the costs of the CIA and

its pay-roll are padded to the rafters.

So long as we need intelligence, no meat-ax approach can cure this hypertrophy of the "intelligence community." However, a realistic approach can be made by having the total appropriation for the CIA voted on directly and as such by Congress. The power of the purse is almost the only power left to the legislative arm of American government and, between passing annual \$40 billion defense budgets, Congress might take a good hard fiscal look at this Fourth Branch of government.

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